This Article explores what the purposes, history and text of the Confrontation Clause have to say about the admission of non-testimonial hearsay statements. Part I examines historical sources such as the common law near the Founding, as well as the text of the clause, and concludes that non-testimonial hearsay was one of the ills that the Confrontation Clause was designed to protect. Part I additionally proposes a two-tiered approach to interpreting the Confrontation Clause, in which testimonial statements receive the most vigorous form of constitutional scrutiny, but non-testimonial statements receive meaningful scrutiny as well. The United States Constitution is no stranger to such a two-tiered approach to implementing its amendments. 22 Part II of the paper then more carefully explores what "confrontation" should mean, both historically and practically, in the context of non-testimonial 103 15 See, e.g., Compan v. People, 121 P.3d 876 (Co. 2005) (noting that Crawford leveled several criticisms at the Roberts approach that would apply with equal force to its application to nontestimonial statements.") Consider the Crawford Court's claim that " [r] eliability is an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63. 16 21 Id. at 384-85. 22 See infra note 83 and the substantive accompanying text.
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hearsay. After marshalling relevant caselaw, historical texts, jury instructions and practioners' guides, Part II additionally concludes that simply re-implementing Roberts would not adequately or faithfully result in the type of meaningful confrontation demanded by the clause. Part III then proposes four interpretive reforms that would bring American courts closer to harmonizing the Confrontation Clause's regulation with the provision's full range of historical and practical values.
I. The Case for Limiting the Confrontation Clause to Testimonial Statements, and Why It Is Wrong
A. Taking A Historical, and Purposive, Look at the Confrontation Clause
The term "testimonial" is not yet a term of precision, as the Crawford Court left "for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition" of the word. Still, there are some situations that courts routinely agree are not testimonial, including conversations between relatives and friends in which neither party has reason to suspect the statements will be repeated in a legal or investigative setting. 23 And there are cases reported at or around the Founding in which common law courts rejected such non-testimonial statements as inadmissible.
One critical case-on-point is King v. Brasier.
24
Decided less than a decade before the ratification of the United States Constitution, this British appellate decision has proved endurant; it was even cited by a Crawford concurring opinion as an example of the type of case that was likely on the Framers' minds at the time they crafted the Confrontation Clause. 25 What neither opinion delivered in Crawford states, however, are the facts or holding of Brasier.
In King v. Brasier, a child-victim of assault and attempted-rape "immediately" informed her mother of "all the circumstances of the injury which had been done to her." The court noted that no circumstances could confirm the victim's story, except that the defendant had lodged at the same place the victim described. While the girl did not testify at trial, her statements came in through her mother's testimony. The court concluded that this method of admission was improper-and indeed the fact that the statements were of a nature that the Crawford regime terms "non-testimonial" made the statements less credible, not more so: The court expressed unanimous concern that the girl's statements were not made under oath; therefore, these statements "ought not have been received." Also of note is that the 104 23 25 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 70 (Rehnquist, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part). Brasier was also cited in the most recent case interpreting the confrontation clause. Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2277.
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Month 20xx] 105 court referred to the girl's statements as "testimony," stating that "no testimony whatever can be legally received except upon oath." (emphasis added). This adds credence to the idea that any time a statement is presented to a jury for the truth of the matter asserted 26 , that statement constructively becomes "testimony" and the author becomes a witness. 27 One could attempt to dismiss Brasier as a hearsay case rather than a case properly viewed as a precursor to the Confrontation Clause. 28 There are a few problems with this perspective. First, in the four times this case has been cited in American jurisprudence, three have cited it for its bearing on their Confrontation Clause interpretations, and one cited it as useful in determining whether a child was competent to take the stand. 29 None have cited it merely for its hearsay implications. Thus, if one were to argue that this were a hearsay case rather than a Confrontation Clause case, the burden would be on them to demonstrate why almost every American appellate jurist to have reviewed the Brasier has been wrong about its implications.
The second problem with this characterization is that the Brasier opinion lacks any discussion of hearsay or its exceptions. For example, despite the fact that the girl reported her injuries "immediately on her coming home," there is no discussion as to whether this statement constituted an excited utterance-a principle that dates back at least to 1602 in Thompson and Ux' v. Trevanion.
30
One does not need to look to England, however, to find examples of Founding-era cases revealing that the Confrontation Clause was intended to cover non-testimonial statements. In one of the earliest American cases to cite the Con-105 26 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9 (internal references omitted) ("The Clause does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted."). When a party introduces out-of-court statements that are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, the federal rules permit limiting instructions prohibiting the jury from considering such statements for their truth. 
31
The case involved, inter alia, the admissibility of a statement made by Herman Blannerhasset to another lay witness, statements that were apparently not made in preparation for or in anticipation of a legal investigation or proceeding. Still, the court found that this statement should not have been admitted. The Court cited Confrontation Clause concerns both indirectly and directly. Indirectly, the court expressed concern the admitted statements were being used "to criminate others than him who made it." 32 More directly, Chief Justice Marshall explained, that he did not know "why a man should have a constitutional claim to be confronted with the witnesses against him, if mere verbal declarations, made in his absence, may be evidence against him." He then immediately added, "I know none, by all are more concerned. I know none, by undermining which life, liberty and property, might be more endangered. It is therefore incumbent on courts to be watchful of every inroad on a principle so truly important."
33 Chief Justice Marshall made such remarks in a case that did not involve what Crawford calls "testimonial" statements.
In Crawford, Justice Scalia dismissed Chief Justice Marshall's strong statements about the Confrontation Clause as an unbinding "passing reference."
34
This characterization of the above sixty-eight-word discussion of the Confrontation Clause misses the point. Even if Justice Marshall's statement is dicta, that negates its precedential, but not historical force. For example, Justice Scalia cites old British cases from the Eighteenth Centuries presumably not because he thinks these international opinions are binding on the United States, but because he thinks they provides evidence of this historical mood-of the brand of concerns that were on the Framers' minds when they crafted the Confrontation Clause. Considering the Burr's temporality to the Founding, and considering Chief Justice Marshall's personal connections to the Founders, 35 the Burr Court's turn-of-the-century declaration should presumably be at least as historically persuasive as a turn-of-thecentury British case.
When one reaches back further, well before the Founding, it becomes even harder to historically justify limiting the Confrontation Clause to mere testimonial statements, especially when this limitation is based on the increasingly common presumption that ex parte witness examinations such as sir Walter Raleigh's in the 1600's were the primary basis of the Confrontation Clause. 36 In fact, the Crawford Court cited Hermann and Speer's piece for its historic evidence. 38 The court seemed unaware, however, of how the existence of precursors to the Confrontation Clause undermines the conventional wisdom: that ex parte witness examinations in the 1600's were the starting point for the clause. 39 The Supreme Court even noted just a few decades ago that the right to confront one's accusers existed at least 2,000 years. 40 In a passage cited in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, found in the Biblical Book of Acts, Paul states, "It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to die, before which that he which is accused have the accusers face to face, and have license to answer for himself concerning the crime laid against him." 41 Consider, too, the story of Susanna, 42 which explicitly served as partial justification for more transparent pre-trial testimonial examinations during the Twelfth Century 43 --the sort of liberal reforms that served as precursors to the Confrontation Clause. 44 In the story of Susanna, two respected male members of a community threaten to accuse Susanna of adultery if she does not submit to sexual relations with them. Susanna, conflicted and pained, refuses to give into the request and the men fulfill their threat by accusing her of adultery. (Notably, the first person who her accusers tell is not a court officer, but Susanna's servants). At trial, her life is sparred, but only because Daniel-who enters as her advocate-requested that he be allowed to sequester and examine the accusers. 45 Upon doing so, he identified gross inconsistencies in their stories.
46
Although Susanna's accusers presented testimony, it seems odd to conclude that accusations would have been less problematic if they had been nontestimonial-and had not been subjected to Daniel's pithy, but powerful cross-107 37 Id. 38 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43. 39 See Hermann, supra note 37. See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156-157 n.10 (1970) (Harlan, J.) (citing Sir Raleigh's trial and noting that "at least one author traces the Confrontation Clause to the common-law reaction against these abuses of the Raleigh trial.); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44 (citing the Raleigh trial). These sources tell explain how Raleigh's alleged accomplice implicated him in a crime, but Raleigh was not permitted to ask questions to demonstrate that this alleged accomplice "had lied to save himself. Crawford, supra. 40 There is at least one strong counterargument to my thought experiment. That is, one could contend my hypothetical merely shows the importance of hearsay rules, which may have different roots and purposes than the Confrontation Clause. 47 The counterargument might note the Confrontation Clause is a protection against governmental tyranny, like all of the other clauses in the Bill of Rightsand statutory law should alternatively regulate hearsay.
I offer two responses. First, the notion that the Bill of Rights is generally about protection from government tyranny does not logically lead to the conclusion that the Confrontation Clause was solely intended to curb ex-parte-witness examinations. There are, for example, clauses in the Bill of Rights in which the aim is to lead to more reliable trials-rather than merely trying to curb government evils. For example, the Due Process clause of Fifth Amendment has been generally interpreted to serve as a shield against other types of grossly unreliable or arbitrary evidence. 48 Second, ex parte secret examinations played absolutely no part in the story of Susanna-the very story that helped lead to the increased confrontation and transparency that graced some Twelfth Century European courts. Thus, to accept the argument that the Confrontation Clause is only about ex parte witnesses, one would have to accept that United States' Confrontation Clause had a significantly narrower purpose than the confrontation-related reforms that predated it centuries earlier. That is, one would have to accept that Medieval officials had more robust, progressive and ambitious goals when constructing its confrontation-related reforms than the Framers did when constructing the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. And more dramatically, one would further have to assume that the Founders were not influenced by the historical, European predecessors to the Confrontation Clause. It is simply not clear that this is case.
49
B. The Tale of the Inconclusive Text
The Confrontation Clause's text was important to the Crawford Court when it concluded that testimonial hearsay should pass a particularly high bar before being admitted against criminal defendants. Part of its analysis centered on the definition of "witness." 50 The Court reasoned that, within the context of the Con- The most direct rebuttal to this textual argument is that on its own terms, the word "witness" can mean more than one who "bears testimony." For example, as the Crawford court acknowledged, the word can also plausibly mean one "whose statements are offered at trial." 54 Other commentators have launched that particular critique.
55
Legal text-based analysis is quite often governed by the ordinary usage of words and is sometimes aided by what precedent has to say about the definition of a given word. 56 Neither of these approaches gets much play in Crawford. That is, other than citing a single dictionary from 1828 which points in one direction, and a treatise by Dean Wigmore which points in the opposite direction, the court does not wrestle with the plain meaning of the word "witness."
57
What is more, to adopt the "bears testimony" definition of "witness," the Court ironically had to massage the word "testimony"-and by the end, the word "testimony" barely resembled the way that it is commonly used in the English language. In the context of American trials at the time of the founding, the word "testimony" almost always meant words delivered while on the stand before a court, grand jury or jury. For example, the word was used in roughly twenty times American cases during the year of 1787-and each time it was used to refer to a trial or hearing, 58 One comes to a similar conclusion when compares the Crawford Court's definition of "testimony" to what is perhaps the most common definition of "testify" today: "To make a declaration of truth or fact under oath; submit testimony." 60 That is the first definition given by the American Heritage Dictionary. And as the concurring opinion of Rehnquist and O'Connor notes, the majority in Crawford does not limit the reach of the Confrontation Clause to statements made under oath either.
61
This is not to suggest that the definition of "witness" the court invoked was too broad. For historical and purposive reasons already discussed, that would be a mistake.
62 Rather, the above glimpse at the various meanings of the word "testimony" suggests that when the Court concluded that the best definition of "witness" was "bear testimony," that did not alone move the ball very far, because the court went on to bless a definition of "testimony" that is incongruent with the general meaning of that word at the Founding.
The broader definition of witness that the court did not embrace-"one 'whose statements are offered at trial'"-should have received more attention. 63 In fact, the United States Supreme Court, over a century ago, implied that this interpretation comported with the text. In Mattox v. United States, the court stated that "there could be nothing more directly contrary to the letter of the [Confrontation Clause] than the admission of dying declarations." 64 The court continued, "They are rarely made in the presence of the accused; they are made without any opportunity for cross-examination, nor is the witness brought face to face with the jury…" 65 The court went on to add that courts tolerated the admission of dying declarations out of necessity. Still, these preceding quotations from the Mattox court show that, for those justices, applying the word "witness" to a hearsay declarant was not only an ordinary use of the word-but an apparently unassailable interpretation if the text were all that mattered.
(Conn.Super. 1787). (referring to the contents of a deposition, the court did not use the word testimony in the opinion). 59 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 ("Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at formal trial; and to police interrogations.") 60 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (2000) (the third definition of testify is "to make a statement based on personal knowledge in support of an asserted fact.") 61 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) 62 Indeed, there are other, broader definitions of testify-and the Crawford court's definition of "testify" does not really comport with those definitions of witness either. American Heritage, supra. C.f. Id. (the first three definitions of witness are: "to be present at or have personal knowledge of; to take note of observe; to provide or serve as evidence of.") 62 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 63 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43, citing 3. J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1397, p. 104. See also OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d. ed. 1989), available at (http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50286399?query_ type=word&queryword=witness&first=1&max_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&result_place =1&search_id=szV9-rnxyRG-16204&hilite=50286399) (subscription required) (defining witness, in part, as "The action or condition of being an observer of an event.") 64 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (emphasis added) 65 Id.
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Despite the evidence supporting a broad definition of the word "witness," there is another powerful text-based counterargument in favor limiting the word to so-called "testimonial" statements. Perhaps the strongest argument for such a limitation appears in the works of Akhil Reed Amar. He maintains that limiting the clause to "testimonial" statements would create structural consistency within the constitution as to how we interpret the word "witness."
66 Amar points on that in the amendment immediately preceding the Sixth Amendment, we have had occasion to interpret the phrase that a defendant shall not "be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." 67 (After all, in statutory interpretation, we do not generally favor interpreting the same word differently in different parts of the text without a very good reason. 68 ) And in the Sixth Amendment, we have limited the word witness to the testimonial context. Amar's argument is appealing. Consistency, on its face, is better than inconsistency. And the Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendments were, after all, enacted at the same time.
However, the word "testimonial" has not tended to apply identically in the contexts of those two amendments. In the cases that have subsequently provided greater clarity to the meaning of the word "testimonial," the court makes no reference whatsoever to the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause. 69 Instead, the Crawford court stated that it would provide a definition of testimonial on "another day," leaving lower courts temporarily free to interpret the word within certain parameters. 70 Nor should it should be ignored that the Supreme Court's attempt to import the values and meaning of the Fourth Amendment into the Fifth Amendment has been roundly criticized by courts and commentators 75 -which should give jurists pause before importing the meaning of the Fifth Amendment into the Sixth Amendment .
Finally, there are other constitutional contexts in which two amendments were passed at roughly the same time, and contained the same word-but yet, received different treatment by courts without much fanfare. The word "enforce," for example, has a different meaning, with different restrictions, within the contexts of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. Both amendments say that congress may enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions in the amendment. 76 Yet, in the Fourteenth Amendment context alone has the court restricted the Congress's power to those actions that are congruent to and proportional with 112 73 U.S. Const. Amend V. ("nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself"). See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 563-564 (1892) ("It is an ancient principle of the law of evidence, that a witness shall not be compelled, in any proceeding, to make disclosures or to give testimony which will tend to criminate him or subject him to fines, penalties or forfeitures.") (emphasis added). 74 
C. Fulfilling the Primary and Secondary Goals of The Confrontation Clause
There is evidence that a "practice intended to be prohibited by [the Confrontation Clause] was the secret examinations, so much abused during the reign of the Stuarts."
78 Unlike some commentators, 79 I acknowledge that prohibiting ex parte examinations may have been one the chief goals of the clause. I concede this in part because of the evolving consensus 80 around the issue and in part because the explanation can be found in at least one 19th century case. 81 This point also should likely be conceded because Crawford is simultaneously so young and so well-accepted. 82 However, concluding that testimonial statements are the primary infirmity the Confrontation Clause intended to remedy is not antithetical to acknowledging that nontestimonial statements, too, are within the scope of the clause.
Testimonial statements and non-testimonial statements should receive two separate tiers of protection under the Confrontation Clause. This certainly would not be the first constitutional provision to be interpreted in such a way. Since the early 1940's, courts have afforded a different brand of protection to commercial speech than to other forms of speech in the context of the First Amendment. 83 And even more starkly, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection clause provides different tiers of scrutiny to certain government acts or classifications depending on the extent to which the classification accords with the intent and overarching purpose of the clause.
84 Following these models, in Part II of this paper, I explore the potential meaning of "confrontation" in the context of non-testimonial hearsay statements.
113 77 One of the enduring problems with the Roberts test is that, even after Crawford, courts continued to apply it in a starkly inconsistent matter. By inconsistent, I do not merely mean that similar facts sometimes led to different results. Rather, courts adopted ways of applying Roberts that stood fundamentally opposite to each other. Two examples of this are: (1) whether it is proper for courts to look to corroborating evidence to determine if a statement is reliable; (2) whether, in the context of child abuse cases, the child-victim's use of age-appropriate language or, alternatively, adult language serves as an indicator of reliability. These are dichotomous propositions that courts applied on a somewhat regular basis during the Roberts era.
1.Corroborating evidence
In the two years following Crawford and preceding Davis, when courts are determined whether non-testimonial hearsay had particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, they were inconsistent as to whether they consider evidence that tends to corroborate the declarant's claims. For And to the extent the Hammond court was following intrajurisdictional precedent, it was not an entirely rogue decision.
99
It is difficult to imagine two more contradictory applications of a legal rule than the above illustrations.
100 Part of what is especially striking about this inconsistency is that it is outcome determinative. For example, when Nevada Supreme Court concluded that corroborating evidence is an impermissible consideration, it went on to conclude that the admission of the statement by the trial court was reversible error. 109 And yet a third approach has been adopted by Missouri appellate courts, which have explained that "the child's knowledge of the subject matter and whether it is unexpected of a child of similar age, rather than the specific words that must be examined in reliability analysis."
110 Indeed, Missouri concluded a decade ago that "a test based upon age-appropriate vocabulary words is unworkable."
111
The above cases alone reveal at least three different approaches courts took when assessing the reliability of non-testimonial child-hearsay in sexual abuse cases. Under the most common approach, courts considered age-appropriate language a sign of reliability because it suggests that the child has not been improperly "coached" about what to say in order to obtain a conviction. 112 language while being sexually abused. 113 Then, a third approach abandoned the use of terminology as a factor at all-because of administrability concerns. And defendants, depending on the jurisdiction that they were in, got different doses of "Confrontation Clause" medicine-all called "Roberts," but all with different active ingredients.
B. And Besides, Roberts Misses Much of the Point of Confrontation
The purposes, goals, and salutary effects of cross examination overlap only slightly with those of Ohio v. Roberts. A close look at the Roberts test demonstrates that above all else, it most effectively tests statements for sincerity. But cross-examination (and face-to-face access to accusers) is about far more than simply testing whether or not a witness is sincere. Before identifying what forms of Confrontation Clause protection should supplement or replace the Roberts test for non-testimonial statements, it is important first to search for the full range of goals of cross-examination, and then assess both what Roberts does well and what it does not.
Confrontation: What's the Point?
In the context of live-witness testimony, courts have found that the Confrontation Clause embodies two requirements: the right to see witnesses "face-toface" 114 at trial, and the right to thoroughly 115 cross-examine 116 government witnesses. It has been recognized both by historians and by the Supreme Court that part of the value of face-to-face meetings with one's accuser is that a witness "may feel quite differently when he has to repeat his story looking at the man who he will harm greatly by distorting or mistaking facts. He can now understand what sort of human being the man is." 
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Month 20xx] 118 ception and memory; (2) to give fact-finders an opportunity to assess witnesses' demeanor and language when their story is subjected to vigorous testing; (3) to allow attorneys to make arguments which focus the fact-finders' attention to key points; (4) to cause a witnesses' story to be subjected to immediate testing; and (5) to create the opportunity for witnesses' potential biases or fabrications to be exposed. Cross-examination is not merely about testing the sincerity of a witness, but also about "delv[ing] into the witness' story to test the witness' perceptions and memory."
118 Jury instructions, for example, encourage jurors to consider memory as a factor in assessing the credibility. 119 Indeed, some studies maintain that mistaken eye-witnesses account for "nearly sixty-five percent of the total mistaken convictions studied came from this one cause alone." 120 This, perhaps, is why trial advice dispensed by top lawyers focuses on the importance of curbing the likelihood of convictions by using cross-examination as an opportunity to reveal a witnesses' faulty or wavering memory. 121 Similarly, cross-examination allows fact-finders the opportunity to assess a witness's demeanor on the stand when his or her story is subjected to rigorous testing. "Sometimes the conditions under which the observation is claimed to have been made are such that assertions such as 'I am sure…' are doubtful on their face."
122 Sample model jury instructions, for example, demonstrate courts' recognition that cross-examination in particular helps jurors assess witnesses' credibility through their demeanor. Model Federal Jury recommend that judges ask jurors, "Was the witness candid, frank and forthright? Or, did the witness seem as if he or she was hiding something, being evasive or suspect in some way? How did the Two other benefits of cross-examinations, cited less frequently, are that they: (1) permit a form of argument by attorneys which focus the fact-finder's attention to key themes and (2) allow the witness's story to be subjected to immediate testing. Cross-examination has historically done both. In John Langbein's Orgins of the Modern Adversarial Trial, for example, he discusses a major trial circa 1790 in which a defense attorney used his "cross-examination to formulate the argument" that he wanted the fact-finder to consider.
124
That defense attorney was not alone; around the same time, there was a general trend or "phenomenon" of defense counsel-using cross-examination "to evade the ban on addressing the jury." Id. And much more recently, in 1974, the United States Supreme Court noted that part of the problem with limiting a defense counsel's cross-examination was that "the jurors were entitled to have the benefit of the defense theory before them so that they could make an informed judgment…" 125 The United States Supreme Court, D.C Circuit and Sixth Circuit have further reasoned that the "right to immediate cross-examination [] has always been regarded as the greatest safeguard of American trial procedure."
126 "[I]mmediate cross-examination is the most effective" and "delayed cross-examination is the least effective."
127 Likewise, the value of cross-examination's immediacy is expressed quite succinctly and effectively in the seventy-year-old Minnesota case State v. Saporen. There the court explained that the "chief merit of crossexamination is not that at some future time it gives the party opponent the right to dissect adverse testimony. Its principal virtue is in its immediate application of the testing process. Its stokes fall while the iron is hot."
But to recognize the potency of immediacy as a value of actual crossexamination, one need not look to cases like Saporen. Rather one need not look much further than common sense. Imagine if trials were conducted differently: Suppose the government were allowed to conduct direct examinations of each of its witnesses-and that the defense were allowed to ask these witnesses no questions at all until the second half of the case, the portion in which the defense places its case before the jury. By the time a defense attorney were allowed to cross-examine the first witness, the jurors may have settled impressions that are significantly 119 123 Federal Jury Instructions (Matthew Bender) 7-1 (emphasis added) 124 John Langbein, ORIGINS OF THE MODERN ADVERSARIAL TRIAL p. 256 n. 14 125 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S., at 317 n. 5 (requiring lower court to allow a cross-examination regarding potential bias because "[a] partiality of mind at some former time may be used as the basis of an argument to the same state at the time of testifying; though the ultimate object is to establish partiality at the time of testifying.") (quoting 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence s 940, 776) (Chadbourn rev. 1970)). 
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harder to rebut than if the defense attorney had been permitted to cross-examine witnesses immediately. One analogous trial-phase that helps illustrate the intuitive force of immediate rebuttal is opening statement. The defense usually has the right to waive opening statement, or postpone opening statement until the beginning of its caseand-chief. 128 Yet, trial strategy texts books warn against actually waiving or postponing an opening.
129
This is because in so doing, one risks allowing the jury to receive a settled, unchallenged impression based on the prosecution's opening statement that may be harder to refute later. 130 There is power in immediate testing. When fashioning a substitute for cross-examination in the context of non-testimonial statements, this value of crossexamination should be remembered.
Roberts' incomplete focus
Despite the multiple purposes and effects of cross-examination, the Roberts test, at least in practice, places a virtually singular focus on the sincerity of the speaker, to the exclusion of the other factors that shed light on the reliability of a speaker. As one commentator noted hyperbolically well over a century ago, crossexamination may be "the most perfect and effectual system for the unraveling of falsehood ever devised by the ingenuity of mortals." 131 Still, the Roberts test may place too much emphasis on this sincerity factor at the expense of others, such as challenging mistaken witnesses.
a. How sincerity is often treated as sufficient under Roberts
The Roberts test, as you will recall, admits all statements that fall into a firmly rooted hearsay exception. The chief historical justification for these hearsay exceptions is that they minimize the possibility that declarants are intentionally lying. In the first recorded example of the "excited utterance" exception appearing at the English common law, the court gave this sole explanation for it: the statement was made "before that she had time to devise or contrive any thing for her own advantage."
132 Similar language appears in early cases explaining the rationale of the dying declaration. The 1789 case of King v. Woodcock, 133 for example, provides "the general principle upon such evidence is admitted." That principle is: when the party is at the point of death, and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth, a situation so solemn, and so awful, is considered 120
by the law as creating an obligation that which is imposed by a positive oath administered in a Court of Justice.
Notably, this general principle says nothing about whether dying declarations enhance the declarant's memory or recollection. The court relied solely on declarants' motives and sincerity. These early justifications, with a few hiccups, 134 have survived. The Advisory Committee Notes, written by the authors of the Rules of Evidence, explain that the "theory of [the excited utterance exception] is simply that circumstances may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication."
135 These advisory notes acknowledge that "stilling the capacity of reflection" may serve to impede accuracy in some ways. 136 The fact that such statements are marked by sincerity, though, is sufficient for this venerable "firmly rooted" 137 hearsay exception. Likewise, the advisory notes make equally patent that sincerity the underlying justification for the medical-diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule.
138
The Advisory Committee Notes' justification for the "dying declaration" exception to the hearsay rule is less clear. These notes state that under such circumstances "it can scarcely be doubted that powerful psychological pressures are present." More illuminating, though are the sources the committee then cites for this proposition. There are two. One is Woodcock-a case in which the justification, as noted above, is tied to sincerity rather than more general concerns about accuracy.
139
The other source is Dean Wigmore's evidence treatise, which also relies on the declarant's sincerity when explaining this particular exception. 140 b. The disconnect between "firmly rooted" exceptions and confrontation generally Sincerity may be a sufficient ground upon which to fashion a statutory exception to the hearsay rule. That determination is beyond the scope of this Article. Yet, demonstrating that a speaker was probably sincere should not, standing alone, serve as a substitute for constitutionally mandated confrontation. As articulated,
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there are at least 141 five different key values that buoy confrontation-including its power in demonstrating faulty memory or accidentally false eyewitness identifications. This is not merely academic, since so many false convictions are a result of such identifications.
142
Meaningful attempts to import the values of crossexamination into Confrontation Clause requirements must account for more than the sincerity of the declarant.
III. The Clause's Perimeter: Looking Forward
Four reforms would improve how courts treat non-testimonial statements under the Confrontation Clause. First, courts should be required to admit impeachment materials (such as prior inconsistent statements and prior convictions) against hearsay-declarants, if those materials would have been admitted against a live witness. Second, criminal defendants should be permitted to introduce these impeachment materials immediately after the declarant's hearsay statements are placed into evidence. Third, courts should adopt a modified Roberts test, 143 and supply clearer standards for courts to use when applying the "particularized guarantees" prong of the test. Fourth, on a discretionary basis, trial-court judges should be permitted to allow criminal defense attorneys to argue immediately to the factfinder any deficiencies in government-admitted non-testimonial hearsay.
A. Proposals One and Two: Immediate Admission of Impeachment Materials
Courts should be required to admit impeachment materials against prosecutorial hearsay-declarants if those materials would have been admitted against a live witness.
144 This is not a particularly radical proposal. Currently, Federal Rule of Evidence 806 already requires the admission of such evidence in federal court on the grounds that a declarant's "credibility should in fairness be subject to impeachment and support as though he had in fact testified. In 2006, the Connecticut Supreme Court was asked to consider whether the Confrontation Clause requires the admission of impeachment materials against the statements of hearsay declarants. 149 The court concluded that "the letter [of impeachment] should have been admitted as proper evidence" 150 -without citing what statutory authority, if any, it used to reach this conclusion. After finding that the letter should have been admitted to impeach the declarant, the court then explained it "need not determine" whether the trial court's exclusion of the letter constituted "an impropriety of constitutional magnitude…" 151 Considering Rule 806 at the federal level, and the manner in which courts are handling the issue the state level, readers may ask: why elevate this to a constitutional requirement at all? Here are three reasons. First, statutory evidenceadmission is governed by an abuse of discretion standard, 152 whereas constitutional errors are generally reviewed de novo. tions, the government must prove that such errors are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 154 whereas for statutory evidentiary errors, a less stringent harmless-error test applies. 155 It is therefore not wholly irrelevant what source of authority a court invokes on when addressing this impeachment issue. 156 Third, constitutionalizing the impeachment-rule would further align requirements of the Confrontation Clause more closely with some of that clause's underenforced norms. That is, impeachment materials such as prior inconsistent statements do not necessarily just attack a witness's motives or sincerity. These materials also can demonstrate problems with a witness's memory or perception, a confrontation-related value that current Confrontation Clause doctrine often neglects.
Further, the admission of such impeachment materials should occur immediately after the non-testimonial hearsay statements are admitted. "Immediately" roughly means after the direct examination of the witness who reports the out-of-court statements. To require the admission of impeachment materials before that would unnecessarily disrupt trial continuity. Also, the moment immediately after direct-examination, is when the defense would generally get to cross-examine the declarant if he or she were a live witness.
The virtues of immediacy, and its relationship to the Confrontation Clause, are discussed in Part (II)(B)(1)(d) of this paper. Building on that theme, requiring courts to admit impeachment materials immediately is a rather low-cost burden on courts that would further make Confrontation Clause values and Confrontation Clause requirements one in the same.
C. Proposal Three: Bringing out the Best of Roberts
Many 158 This paper exposed that the problem with (a) is that it places an emphasis on the sincerity of the statement made, at the exclusion of all other Confrontation Clause values. The problem with (b) was its inconsistent application.
Yet, adopting the proposed rule could particularly solve some of the problems associated with the "firmly rooted hearsay exception" prong of the old Roberts test. That is because that prong is not inherently flawed-just incomplete. As discussed, excited utterances and dying declarations, for example, are premised on the notion that such declarants are likely sincere. But there are other reasons that a speaker might be unreliable, unrelated to his or her sincerity, such as flawed memory or compromised perception. Under the proposed approach, courts would have the ability to consider these additional variables.
In particular, this proposal urges courts to consider whether the defendant has demonstrated:(1) a substantial risk: that the hearsay statement was made under circumstances that raise serious doubts about the declarant's ability to recall or perceive recounted events; or (2) a substantial risk of bias on the part of the declarant that cannot be neutralized through the immediate admission of impeachment materials. These two considerations are among the chief pillars of confrontation. 159 To be sure, if courts' treatment of the "particularized guarantees" prong of Roberts is any indication, this aspect of my proposal would only rarely make a difference in cases. 160 Still, as it stands, contrary the history and purpose of the Confrontation Clause, this provision currently affords defendants no protection from these statements whatsoever. Accordingly, this proposal represents an improvement from that baseline, an improvement that other commentators can further build upon.
In any event, the modified Roberts test would have the biggest impact when statements do not fall into a firmly rooted hearsay exception at all. They would never be admitted. However, this was the rule throughout the British common law and throughout the 19th Century here in America. Mattox v. United States, issued in 1895, cited one exception to the Confrontation Clause: the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule. 161 Likewise, prior to Crawford, at least one state ruled that it was never permissible to admit statements against the accused unless they fell into a firmly-rooted hearsay exception. 162 facto satisfy the right of confrontation. Rather we require a separate confrontation clause analysis designed to guarantee the reliability of the challenged coconspirator statements.") 158 If observers view this rule as too stringent, another alternative modification to Roberts that should be considered would be to admit statements falling into "widely-accepted" hearsay exceptions, rather than just "firmly-rooted" ones. This would soften the rule's impact on criminal prosecutions, especially in certain child or domestic abuse cases, in which statements that fall into the not-so-firmlyrooted 163 residual hearsay exception often rest at the heart of the government's case. 164 Nonetheless, this modification would bring Confrontation Clause jurisprudence closer to the following, virtually dormant, high ideal articulated by the Supreme Court less than twenty years ago, which should be the guiding principle of the clauses's requirements: "that the declarant's truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility." 165 
D. Confrontation as Argument
There is one final discretionary proposal. When a trial-court believes it would lend clarity to proceedings, defense attorneys should be permitted to outline for a jury, post-direct examination, the potential deficiencies of a particular hearsay statement. Cross-examination, as discussed in Part II(B)(1)(c), has historically and practically served as an opportunity for attorneys to argue key points, rather than merely elicit answers.
It is not evident that this tool should be etched into constitutional doctrine and rendered mandatory. Caselaw has not generally cited "argument" as a purpose of cross-examination. 166 And in fact, while lawyers use cross-examination as an opportunity for argument, courts use Federal Rule 611(a) 167 to limit questions that are particularly argumentative. Still, there may be scenarios when a judge may conclude, for example, that it is useful for an attorney to point out why a document he or she has entered as impeachment material arguably contradicts the declarant's 126
Month 20xx] 127 hearsay statement. Under such limited scenarios, judges should be equipped with the discretionary power to allow such immediate clarification by attorneys.
E. Concluding Thoughts
If Crawford was "an earthquake rocking America's criminal justice foundations," 168 this Article is an attempt to assess and address one of its aftershocks. Non-testimonial statements are covered by the Confrontation Clause's text, history, and purposes. And although courts ought not be as rigid in rejecting nontestimonial hearsay as they should be with testimonial hearsay, these statements demand meaningful regulation. The Confrontation Clause's values and the Confrontation Clause's requirements can become a united force.
127
168 Drew, supra note 2.
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